THE rescue of hostages held by terrorists at a theatre in Moscow this week has stunned the world. The Russian authorities saved hundreds of lives by using a poison gas to incapacitate the terrorists before they could detonate their bombs, or even put on their gas masks. But the secret knockout agent also killed at least 115 of the hostages.
Despite this tragic death toll such weapons appear to be here to stay. Unfettered by international conventions that bar the use of toxic chemicals in war, governments around the world have decided that knockout agents are a powerful tool for fighting the war on terrorism. Drugs that confuse, repel or sedate people are being weaponised by military researchers for rescuing hostages, riot control or urban warfare. The US may even have begun human trials.
This week鈥檚 rescue demonstrates why many anti-terrorism experts believe these weapons are needed. But, it also reveals that so-called 鈥渘on-lethal鈥� weapons can be anything but.
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To the Russian officials dealing with the hostage crisis, the disabling gas must have seemed a godsend. Security forces released it into the theatre to render the terrorists inside unconscious, or at least unable to shoot accurately or detonate their explosives.
To that extent it worked and perhaps any other strategy could have resulted in even more deaths. Whatever knockout gas was used, it is often true that the more powerful the drug, the narrower the margin between an effective dose and a lethal one. It takes a hugely powerful drug to knock out a person within seconds. And administering enough to fill a large auditorium inevitably means more sensitive bystanders, or those caught in a concentrated pocket of gas, could receive a fatal dose.
But many disturbing questions surround the rescue. One is the official secrecy about the gas. Russian military authorities refused to identify it after the attack, even to doctors treating survivors. Officials insisted this could give future enemies an advantage. Yet that knowledge could have saved lives.
Such secretiveness pervades research into non-lethals. Since 1999, the US has spent more than $100 million on weapons designed to 鈥渋ncapacitate individuals, deny areas to personnel, and clear structures鈥�. Yet the US Department of Defense refuses to publish many reports on what has been done.
The secrecy is not because these weapons necessarily violate any treaties. The Chemical Weapons Convention permits virtually any chemical for law enforcement, apart from those such as sarin or VX, which can only be used as weapons and are banned completely.
Possibly it stems from fears of a public backlash against the research. Yet, the danger is that without proper scientific testing and more open scrutiny, the risks of such weapons may never be fully appreciated, as seems to have happened in Moscow.
There may be more such tragedies. Two years ago, the commander of the US non-lethals programme said that he 鈥渨ould like a magic dust that would put everyone in a building to sleep鈥� (麻豆传媒, 16 December 2000, p 4). One possible candidate is an aerosolised form of the sedative Valium. But as with the Russian agent, there could be a dangerously narrow margin between an effective dose of Valium and a lethal one.
In September this year, documents obtained by the Sunshine Project, a group campaigning against chemical weapons, revealed plans by the University of Pennsylvania to assess the anti-personnel capabilities of an 81-millimetre non-lethal mortar round that has already been subjected to 鈥渉uman effects testing鈥�. But the military refuses to divulge any further details.
Many experts fear that official secrecy, coupled with a regulatory vacuum and an increasing emphasis on fighting terrorism, could allow countries to develop devastating chemical weapons without breaking international law. 鈥淚 fear that countries are developing new types of less-than-lethal agents,鈥� says Jean-Pascal Zanders of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 鈥淭his could undermine the core purpose of the chemical weapons treaty, to completely eliminate chemical weapons for the sake of mankind.鈥�
Yet without some oversight, the possibilities for non-lethals could reach far beyond the rescue of hostages. Donald Watenpaugh of the University of North Texas in Denton told a high-level conference last November that putting long-lasting 鈥渁nti-aggression chemicals鈥� in the water might be the ultimate solution for regions plagued by war. But he admitted: 鈥淢isuse of anti-aggression technology to control civilian populations constitutes a frightening potential problem with this idea.鈥�
Despite such risks, increasing antipathy to arms control means these weapons are unlikely to be banned by any forthcoming treaties. The secretive weapons programmes appear to be here to stay.