WHETHER they are occurring in nature or being created in a lab, biological threats represent a global moral burden. Right now infectious diseases threaten personal, national and international security, and limit personal and economic potential.
Worldwide, they cause more than 18 million deaths a year 鈥� one-third of all human deaths. Among these deaths are many that could be prevented by concentrated efforts in the research, development and distribution of new drugs. While dangerous pathogens will not mobilise armies nor annex land, they can, if unchecked, inflict human costs rivalling those of armed conflict.
We don鈥檛 have to accept this state of affairs 鈥� we can tackle the problem head-on. My colleagues and I are pushing for the adoption of a that will work with states in the form of a treaty and with NGOs, academic institutions and the private sector as a softer, pledge-based agreement.
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The compact sets out a four-point plan of action. First, we need to keep key information available globally by establishing a shared international data and knowledge base for infectious diseases. This will include biosurveillance information and research data, while remaining cautious about publicising research and development that may be viewed as dual use for biosafety and defence.
Second, we need to establish an international network of research centres that will support fundamental research on microbial threats. There is a precedent for the success of international collaborative research efforts. In the late 1960s, reacting to a projected crisis in food supply, the (CGIAR) devised a framework for addressing the situation. As a result of CGIAR鈥檚 efforts the world experienced a massive increase in cereal yield in the second half of the 20th century and the crisis was in part averted. The , funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and sustained by CGIAR, sets an example for a future interdisciplinary network of infectious disease research centres.
鈥淭here is a precedent for the success of international collaborative research efforts鈥�
Third, we need to expand our capabilities for the production of vaccines and drugs against emerging and re-emerging infections by working with groups such as the (OECD) and the . These bodies are addressing issues of intellectual property, incentive structures for drug development, distribution and monitoring, and manufacturing capacity in the developing world.
Finally, we need to establish and maintain international standards for laboratory best practice and for regulating pharmaceuticals.
The success of the global compact will be dependent on the interplay between its four components. For example, an organisation contributing to the knowledge base or complying with regulatory policies would benefit by being allowed to participate in the research enterprise or receiving the results of the expanded capacity for drug development and distribution. Not participating, by contrast, could seriously disadvantage an organisation.
Meanwhile, a strong foundation of basic science will help to restore the flow of new drugs and vaccines, which has been stagnant. Effective biosurveillance will help to predict which strain of an emerging disease represents the most significant threat, and this in turn will help to create countermeasures. Information technology and knowledge sharing will drive new science, which in turn can inform regulatory initiatives. Addressing the problem as a whole benefits each individual part, creating powerful incentives to participate.
The Global Compact for Infectious Diseases is achievable. In the past 25 years, projects with international scope and impact have demonstrated that efforts at resolving complex and sometimes overlooked issues are feasible. Just look at the Ottawa Landmines treaty. In October 1992, six NGOs met in New York City and founded the (ICBL). A mere five years later, the ICBL was awarded the 鈥渁s a model for similar processes in the future鈥�.
My colleagues and I propose as a matter of urgency that efforts be accelerated to draft, debate, refine and implement the first Global Compact for Infectious Diseases. We propose that the drafting work should be carried out initially under the auspices of an academic institution but should include representatives from different countries, the pharmaceutical and information technology industries, international legal scholars, the international development communities and others. We are determined that this work will not be just another conference report but will result in a document that will have real powers and real benefits.
