The extent and brutality of the CIA鈥檚 interrogation methods, made public by a US this week, seem shocking even to those familiar with the agency鈥檚 extrajudicial approach to intelligence gathering. But one of the most important revelations should surprise no one: torture doesn鈥檛 work.
Former vice-president Dick Cheney and other members of President George W. Bush鈥檚 administration have long maintained that enhanced interrogation methods are necessary to prise information from hardened terrorists and to avert 鈥渢icking time bomb鈥� threats. The Senate committee found the opposite. Not once between late 2001 and early 2009 did the CIA鈥檚 use of torture result in intelligence that helped to foil a terrorist plot. All of the most useful information came from standard, non-violent interrogation approaches. Furthermore, tortured detainees frequently made up things in an attempt to get their torturers to stop.
This mirrors what decades of studies into the effects of torture have found. Because a victim鈥檚 priority is to make the pain stop, false confessions are highly likely, which makes pain (both physical and psychological) an ineffective tool for extracting accurate information. , who studies these issues at Reed College in Portland, Oregon, has found that contrary to popular belief, the notoriously brutal methods of Hitler鈥檚 Gestapo produced 鈥減athetic鈥� results, particularly when compared with their use of informants and public cooperation.
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One reason the 鈥渢icking time bomb鈥� myth has been allowed to persist is that the CIA has resisted any scientific oversight of its interrogation programme, instead continuing to use decades-old coercive techniques despite a lack of evidence that they work. A 2006 concluded that the lack of research meant that interrogators had to make things up 鈥渙n the fly鈥�, which was leading to cases of abuse. To redress this, in 2012 the White House put out a for 鈥渂ehavioral science research to advance the science and practice of intelligence interviewing and interrogation鈥�, but it has had little impact so far.
The only role that science has played in the CIA鈥檚 interrogation programme has been hugely controversial. Between 2002 and 2009, the enhanced aspects of the programme were designed and operated by two former military psychologists. 鈥淣either psychologist had any experience as an interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al-Qa鈥檌da, a background in counterterrorism, or any relevant cultural or linguistic expertise,鈥� the Senate investigation found. Other psychologists have had lesser roles in the programme, participating in or overseeing interrogations. This has also proved to be contentious, and the American Psychological Association is currently under fire for allowing its members to take part in coercive interrogations, .
The Senate investigation reveals some dreadful practices that, contrary to the CIA鈥檚 protestations, have probably done little to enhance America鈥檚 safety. Will the agency change its approach? The omens are not good. Before the 9/11 attacks, the CIA had already determined from its own experience that coercive interrogations 鈥渄o not produce intelligence鈥� and 鈥渨ill probably result in false answers鈥�. It didn鈥檛 take long for it to ignore those conclusions.
