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ON 15 March 2019, 51 people were killed in two consecutive shootings at mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. The first of the attacks was live-streamed on Facebook for 17 minutes. But social media wasn鈥檛 only used on the day. It is thought that the accused gunman was radicalised online by far-right extremists before immersing himself in an internet subculture of white supremacist ideology. In short, his journey from personal trainer to gunman was fuelled by social media.

It is an increasingly familiar phenomenon and few people understand it better than Julia Ebner, a counter-extremism expert at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue in London, UK. Over the past decade, she has seen digital technology transform almost every aspect of how radical groups work. She has watched extremists use digital platforms, from anonymous message board 8chan and instant messaging app Telegram to YouTube and Facebook, to disseminate their ideologies, recruit and radicalise new members, and inspire them to carry out violent attacks.

A couple of years ago, Ebner realised that the best way to understand online extremists is to infiltrate their hidden forums. She went undercover, joining dozens of groups, from white nationalists to radical misogynists, to see from the inside how they operate 鈥� and how to counter them. Ebner has documented her experiences in her book Going Dark: The secret social lives of extremists.

Helen Thomson: How easy is it to find the hidden forums where extremist groups hang out?

Julia Ebner: It can be difficult. You might discover a link on YouTube that sends you to a fringe platform, and then another link and another. It鈥檚 hard to find the newest platform that these groups are using 鈥� one will be shut down and another two created. Gab has become the most important alternative to Twitter for the far right. The platform frames itself as a free speech safe haven, so has become the go-to place for many extremists. I鈥檇 say it鈥檚 a radicalisation accelerator.

Sometimes extremists might be using encrypted groups in apps like Telegram or WhatsApp, so you need the exact link to join. And then there is often a recruitment procedure involving a video interview on Skype before you can join any discussions.

How do you go about infiltrating these hidden networks?

It鈥檚 a long process of building up an online persona. With the alt-right group Generation Identity, I was a member of some of their online forums and I found out about a UK branch they wanted to create. It was an interesting opportunity to see what they were planning. I reached out to their members and had to go through several stages of interviews to get into the inner circle. It was helpful to be able to name drop other members I was in touch with through different channels, so they got the feeling I was already part of the network. I learned the language they used and their insider references.

What did you hope to gain from going undercover?

I wanted to have enough information to take more proactive action to prevent attacks or interrupt intimidation campaigns, because that is what is being planned in these hidden forums. The security services are lagging behind. They are reactive in their approach. The Christchurch mosque shootings in New Zealand were a good example. I thought it was necessary to keep a closer eye on these platforms from the inside, but what鈥檚 possible to do in the normal ethical framework of an academic institution is a bit tricky.

How did you get around those restrictions?

I did it outside my day job and imposed my own morals. Once inside a group, I wouldn鈥檛 actively translate materials or help widen the spread of its campaigns, for instance. But sometimes I needed to use methods of deception and adopt fake identities to get access. I usually pretended to be a naive newcomer so I didn鈥檛 have to communicate any racist or extremist views and I forwarded anything important onto the security services.

鈥淭he alt-right often recruit new members by appealing to their love of online games鈥�

Was infiltrating these groups dangerous?

The biggest fear I had throughout was people finding out my real identity or my address, because these groups know how to intimidate you and your family. It鈥檚 called 鈥渄辞虫颈苍驳鈥� and it starts with a form of crowdsourced intelligence gathering. Far-right activists are shockingly good at gathering information from different parts of the internet and putting the pieces together. Once they have enough personal information they usually decide to publish it and tag the victim in the post to intimidate them.

Did you ever find yourself being persuaded by any of these group鈥檚 ideals?

When I investigated jihadism and white nationalism, I was prepared enough to understand their arguments and the radicalisation process, so it wasn鈥檛 difficult to distance myself. But I was taken by surprise by the anti-feminist groups I infiltrated. I made the mistake of spending a lot of time with 鈥淭raditional Wives鈥� while I was in a weak position, going through a relationship crisis of my own. For the first time I could feel myself being drawn in. The people in these groups were touching on topics that I could identify with, they were more relevant to me. They weren鈥檛 talking about racism or discrimination, but the challenges of being a woman in the modern world. It showed me how anyone could be drawn into extremist movements if it happens at the right time.

At one point in your new book, you show how one guy used Facebook, YouTube and Telegram to orchestrate a (foiled) attack in Singapore from thousands of kilometres away. But hasn鈥檛 online communication in some ways also made it easier to track and stop extremists?

It鈥檚 something that the extremists themselves discuss a lot. They need to be found in order to recruit new members, but they also need to hide from activists and authorities. Extremists use lots of different channels, which makes them hard to track. Sometimes they use existing platforms, sometimes they build their own. They have this whole digital ecosystem, which has revolutionised the ways they can communicate, build alternative news, share conspiracy theories and plan activities.

In the early 2000s, there were online forums that jihadists and white supremacists made use of and that could be monitored, but now this cross-platform approach has made it easier for extremist groups to go below the radar of the security services.

Aside from techniques to avoid authorities, what did you learn about how extremists work?

My time in the networks that radicalised the Christchurch suspect taught me about the importance of community, belonging and subculture as motivators and drivers of radicalisation 鈥� even in online spaces. A blend of hate speech, pop culture and dark satire marks these far-right virtual networks, which allows for a very subtle indoctrination and radicalisation. While most of the network鈥檚 users would never meet in real life, they create strong bonds based on their own invented vocabulary, symbols and insider jokes. It was also shocking to see how easily the line between what鈥檚 a game and what鈥檚 real gets blurred. They use gamification a lot.

What is gamification and how is it used by extremists?

The alt-right realised they could recruit new members by appealing to their love of online games. They would use recruiting procedures that had video game elements, so you can climb up the ranking in a group by getting points when you do a particularly good job, like launching a hate campaign, leading a trolling army online or creating a viral tweet. Some people join just because they are interested in the gaming dimension of it and through that they are introduced to these extreme ideologies. I saw very young people becoming members of extremist groups in this way. Groups also produce modifications of existing computer games, where you can switch sides and play for the Nazis, for instance, or that allow a person to shoot only Muslim characters.

鈥淎nyone could be drawn into extremist movements if it happens at the right time鈥�

Why can鈥檛 we just shut down all these groups as soon as we know they exist?

The whole digital sphere is so splintered, with so many subcultures that are so diverse, that there鈥檚 not one approach for all. Some groups are really violent and need to be reported so that their online platforms can be removed. But there is a grey zone where extremists operate on the legal borders of what鈥檚 acceptable communication and behaviour, and there we need a more nuanced approach.

For example, extremists usually know the violence incitement and anti-hate speech laws in their countries fairly well and try to circumvent them by using twisted extremist symbols or camouflaging violent messages behind satirical visuals. They also know that the police tend to only investigate concrete threats, not abstract ones. Extremists might write 鈥淎bout time someone shoots this traitor鈥� or 鈥淚鈥檇 love to see your head hanging from a tree鈥� instead of 鈥淚鈥檒l shoot her鈥� or 鈥淚鈥檒l cut off your head鈥�.

It鈥檚 also difficult because of varying laws in different countries. For instance, if the UK bans a group, Twitter must block its content in the UK, but it is still accessible from other countries. So British people could use a virtual private network (VPN) to access it and circumvent these laws. There鈥檚 a big need for international cooperation in the digital sphere.

What can we do to combat extremist groups online, then?

The most important thing is to make sure that platforms don鈥檛 amplify content that is extreme, that produces fear or anger or that triggers the most extreme comments, which is what they do right now.

The algorithms of most online platforms are designed to maximise the time users spend there, so most business models boil down to an endless competition for human attention. This means that content which captures our attention is amplified and usually this happens to be the most extreme, most emotive or most violent posts and videos. Extremists therefore have an inherent advantage when they try to spread content that instils fear, generates anger or incites violence. Experimenting with a neutral account on YouTube demonstrates this: one is very likely to end up in an extremist echo chamber after 24 hours. If one starts with a video on jogging this might just mean finding oneself with videos on extreme sports. But for political or patriotic videos it might well be violent white supremacy.

It鈥檚 a business model that distorts public perception. It gives small groups this megaphone and amplifies these really fringe views. These companies need a lot more pressure to change, because they won鈥檛 do it proactively.